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ATTITUDE TO OTHER NATIONALITIES

The best-liked foreign nationalities are Czechs and Slovaks: almost three-fifths have a positive attitude towards them. The attitude is only slightly worse in case of Italians, the English, Spaniards, the French, Norwegians, the Swiss, Hungarians, Swedes and Americans. Almost half of respondents sympathise with the Dutch, Austrians, Danes, Belgians, the Irish, the Japanese, and Finns. Sympathy to the nations mentioned above is

several times more common than antipathy. About two-fifths of

respondents express positive emotions about Croats, Germans, Greeks, Lithuanians, Bulgarians and Georgians. Positive attitude is twice as common as negative.

About one-third of respondents express sympathy to Russians, Byelorussians, Jews, Armenians, the Chinese, Ukrainians, Egyptians, Serbs and the Vietnamese. Attitude to these nations is characterized by a small plurality of positive feelings, and in some cases positive and negative feelings are equally common.

In case of five nationalities antipathy prevails. They are: Turks, Libyans, Romanians, Roma and Arabs. Antipathy to Roma and Arabs is twice as common as sympathy.

Attitudes to other nationalities are shaped by national stereotypes, historical legacies, current socioeconomic events, personal experiences, and many other factors. For many years, Poles


ATTITUDE TO OTHER NATIONALITIES							
Czechs	58%	6			259	% 1	1% <mark>6%</mark>
Slovaks	57%						0% 8%
Italians	55%				27%		1% 7%
English	<u> </u>				24%	15	
Spaniards	53%				27%	10	
French	53%			27%			3% 7%
Norwegians	52%			26%		10%	
Swiss	52%			26%		11%	
Hungarians	52%			27%		13	
Swedes	51%			27%		139	
Americans	51%			27%		16	
Dutch	49%			31%		10	
Austrians	48%				0%	139	
Danes	48%			27%		14%	11%
Belgians	47%		_	29%		14%	10%
Irish	47%			28%		14%	11%
Japanese	47%				26%		9%
Finns	45%			29%		18% 13%	13%
Croats	44%			27%		18%	11%
Germans	43%			28%		24%	5%
Greeks	40%			30%		21%	9%
Lithuanians	40%		2	28%		23%	9%
Bulgarians	38%			32%		20%	10%
Georgians	37%		29	29%		21%	13%
Russians	34%	27%				33%	6%
Byelorussians	33%	329		6		26%	9%
Jews	33%	30%		2		29%	8%
Armenians	32%	28%		25		5%	15%
Chinese	32%	27%		31		31%	10%
Ukrainians	32%	29%				32%	7%
Egyptians	31%	29%					16%
Serbs	31%	309		% 2		26%	13%
Vietnamese	29%	27%		31		%	13%
Turks	28%	25%		37%			10%
Libyans	26%	26%		32%			16%
Romanians	26%	26%		39%		%	9%
Roma	24%	20%		50%		, 0	<mark>6%</mark>
Arabs 23% 20% 46% 11%							
Sympathy Indifference Antipathy Don't know							

have had better attitude to nationalities living to the north and west of Poland, than to those in the east. Feelings towards nationalities to the south are ambiguous. This distribution of sympathy is associated with the stereotypical image of the rich, developed "West" and poor, backward "East". This stereotype is confirmed by objective measures of socio-economic development, such as UN Human Development Index.

From a longer perspective, it is clear that the attitude to a vast majority of nationalities has improved. Neighbouring states and their inhabitants are increasingly seen positively. In 1993, Czechs and Slovaks were the only nationalities from neighbour states who enjoyed the prevalence of sympathy. At present, positive attitude dominates in attitudes

POLISH PUBLIC OPINION


to all except Ukrainians. While sympathy and antipathy to Ukrainians are equal, the improvement in attitude to them has been the strongest. Compared with 1993, the proportion of respondents who like them has grown three-fold, while the number of respondents who dislike them decreased by half.



More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in Polish: "Attitude to other nationalities", February 2012. Fieldwork for national sample: January 2012 (N=1058). The random address sample is representative for adult population of Poland.


OPINIONS ABOUT THE FISCAL PACT AND DEEPER EU INTEGRATION

Crisis in the financial markets, and the threat of debt default of Greece and other EU member states have made the situation of the European Union more difficult than ever before. In order to handle the difficulties in the eurozone, a fiscal pact was adopted in January and signed in Brussels on 2nd March. Its goal is to prevent the eurozone countries from consequences of excessive debt and budget deficit.




Poles do not have a majority opinion on the fiscal pact. The plurality (42%) accept Polish participation, while about a third of respondents (35%) oppose it.


Although Poles tend to support signing the fiscal pact, they reject the idea of a loan for the IMF to contribute to the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) for the EU countries under threat. The majority (57%) oppose giving such a loan from the reserve of the National Bank of Poland, while one-third (32%) support this move.



The majority of respondents accept the principal components of the fiscal pact: 62% accept increased control over member state budgets by EU institutions, and 65% agree that the EU should be able to impose on the member states fines for breaking the public finance discipline, i.e. excessive budget deficit or debt.




In spite of the financial crisis, Poles have not changed their positive attitude to the European Union and they remain convinced that increasing EU integration is beneficial for Poland (62%). Most respondents do not share the belief that deepening EU integration is a threat to the sovereignty of member states: almost half (48%) reject this idea. Less than one-third (30%) are afraid to delegate the power from the national to the EU level, perceiving a threat to the independence of member states.



In recent years, the acceptance of the introduction of the euro in Poland has diminished due to the information about the financial situation of Greece and other eurozone countries. The majority of respondents (60%) are against entering the eurozone, while one-third (32%) support it.

DO YOU SUPPORT REPLACING POLISH ZLOTY WITH EURO?								
■ Strongly □Moderately □Moderately ■ Strongly □Don't know support support oppose oppose								
I 2002	35%)		29%		13%	9%	14%
I 2007	19%	25%		26	%		20%	10%
XI 2008	19%	28%		21	%		24%	8%
I 2009	24%	2	8%		18%		20%	10%
III 2009	24%	2	9%		219	6	17%	9%
IV 2010	15%	26%		24%			25%	10%
III 2011	11% 2	1%	29	%		3	1%	8%
I 2012	9% 23	3%	25%		3		%	8%


People convinced that euro should be introduced usually think that there should be no rush. Over fourfifths (81%) of proponents of the euro think so, while 15% support introducing the common currency as soon as possible.




More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in Polish: "*Opinions about the fiscal pact and deeper EU integration*", February 2012. Fieldwork for national sample: January 2012 (N=1058). The random address sample is representative for adult population of Poland.

SUPPORT FOR POLES IN THE FORMER USSR

It is estimated that about 20 million Poles live outside Poland. Among them are about 2.5 million citizens of the countries of the former USSR: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kirgizstan, Lithuania, Latvia, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan. Their situation is addressed by the policy towards Poles living abroad. It is stressed that they did not choose their place of residence, and that their situation is often very difficult. Poles living in the area which formerly was a part of Poland are outside of Poland due to the post-war boundary changes, while residents of the eastern part of the former USSR usually were deported themselves, or are descendants of the deported. Although the number of people of Polish nationality in the East is high, and, relative to communities in other countries, there is a lot of information about them in the public discourse, their situation is not widely known to the public. A large number of respondents do not know how they live. In the opinion of the others, the situation of Poles in the former USSR is not good. The situation in Belarus is evaluated worst.




One in twenty respondents (5%) thinks that Poland spends too much public money on support for the Polish community in the East. A quarter (24%) think that the expenses are appropriate, while about a third (35%) believe they are insufficient.



contact with r bhan culture	01			
free Polish language instruction	83	89		
access to public education in Poland	83	10 7		
right to work in Poland	80	<mark>10</mark> 10		
right to settle in Poland	80	<mark>11</mark> 9		
right to do commercial activity in Poland	78	11 11		
financing of Polish educational institutions	73	13 14		
financing of Polish organisations	64	15 21		
financing of Polish media	62	<mark>15</mark> 23		
material help to raise the standard of living	60	14 26		
access to free medical services in Poland	58	14 28		

Respondents almost uniformly think that the Polish state should provide Poles in the East with contact with the Polish culture, free Polish language instruction, and access to public education in Poland. A vast majority believe that they should have the right to settle and work in Poland, as well as being able to do commercial activity. Almost three quarter think that Polish educational institutions should be financed, while a slightly smaller group believe that help for organisations and media of Poles abroad should be given. The majority think that the Polish state should give Poles abroad charitable help and access to medical services in Poland.

Some forms of help for the Polish minority in the East are criticized by various communities and institutions in the host countries. There arises an important issue: to what extent is the support for the minority an internal affair, and to what extent is it an element of international policy. About half of respondents (52%) think that policy to Poles living abroad should be consulted with the state whose citizens they are, while a third (35%) think the support should be given regardless of the reaction of the host country.




More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in Polish: *"Support for Poles in the former USSR"*, February 2012. Fieldwork for national sample: February 2012 (N=999)) The random address sample is representative for adult population of Poland.


PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT ACTA

On 26th January, Poland and 21 other member states of the European Union signed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA), an international agreement whose goal is to fight trade in counterfeit goods and copyright infringement. After a wave of criticism and protest against secrecy of negotiations, potential threats to freedom of speech, reduced access to information, threats to security of personal data, and impediments to technological innovation, some countries have stopped the ratification of the document. Poland is one of them.

The government's decision to halt the ratification process is in tune with the public attitude to this issue, which is critical and hostile. The majority of Poles (58%) are against ratifying ACTA.



Three-fifths of respondents who claim some knowledge of ACTA (60%) believe that this agreement could hamper access to some content on the internet. The same proportion (60%) are afraid that ACTA could endanger the privacy of web users, while a slightly smaller number (57%) believe it would be a threat to free speech on the internet.



More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in Polish: *"Public opinion about ACTA"*, March 2012. Fieldwork for national sample: February 2012 (N=999). The random address sample is representative for adult population of Poland.

 Activities and Experiences in 2011 Social Activity in Civic Organizations Willingness to Cooperate in Years 2002–2012 Party Preferences in February Involvement in Volunteering Opinions About Parliament, President, Trade Unions and NFZ Further Drop in the Government Ratings Trust in Politicians in February Social Moods in February Drug Reimbursement Act and Physicians Protests 100 Days of the Second Donald Tusk's Government 	In addition to the reports referred to above, the following have been published recently (in Polish):	
	 Social Activity in Civic Organizations Willingness to Cooperate in Years 2002–2012 Party Preferences in February Involvement in Volunteering Opinions About Parliament, President, Trade Unions and NFZ Further Drop in the Government Ratings Trust in Politicians in February Social Moods in February Drug Reimbursement Act and Physicians Protests 	and publications please contact: CBOS POLAND 4a, Żurawia, 00-503 Warsaw Phones: (48 22) 629 35 69, 628 37 04 Fax: (48 22) 629 40 89 e-mail: sekretariat@cbos.pl http://www.cbos.pl Yearly subscription rate for "Polish Public Opinion" is 80 USD

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