Poland in the EU

The approval of Poland’s membership in the European Union is universal. In the second half of October, 88% of respondents declared their support for Poland’s membership in this organization. Only 6% of respondents are against our presence in the Community. This means that since 2014, public support for Poland’s presence in the EU has never fallen below 80%. The disapproval in this period did not exceed 13%.

Poles are moderate supporters of the development of European integration. Every second respondent believes that Europe should unite even more. The belief that integration is too far-reaching is expressed by 18% of all people. Nearly one-fourth (23%) have an ambivalent attitude to deepening integration. A similar distribution of answers to the question about the further unification of Europe was obtained in surveys carried out a year and two years ago.

Research carried out after 2013 showed clear symptoms of strengthening identification with Europe. There were more and more people who considered themselves not only Poles, but also Europeans. In March 2019, for the first time over half of respondents (56% in total) declared that they felt European. Currently, declarations regarding national and European identity are very similar to answers obtained more than two years ago. Overall, 55% of respondents feel European, with European identity secondary to national identity (in the case of 50% of respondents), and occasionally recognized as more important (4%) or the only one (1%).

The issue of state sovereignty in the European Union has been frequently raised in Poland in recent years, especially in the context of judicial reform. The reservations of the Polish authorities regarding the limitation of our country’s sovereignty by EU bodies were shared by the Constitutional Tribunal. In the judgment of October 7 this year, referring to the interpretation of the provisions of the Treaty on European Union by the CJEU, it stated, inter alia, that “the bodies
of the European Union operate outside the limits of powers conferred by the Republic of Poland in the treaties" and that, as a result, "the Republic of Poland cannot function as a sovereign and democratic state".

According to more than half of respondents (52%), membership of the EU does not limit Poland’s independence excessively. One-third (34%) are of the opposite opinion. Despite the escalation of the dispute between Poland and the European Union, opinions on this subject are quite stable over time. Moreover, the limitations related to Poland’s presence in the EU are now slightly less often perceived as excessive than before 2016.

Changes over time are more marked in the assessment of Poland’s influence on EU decisions and actions. Although this impact has been perceived by most of the public opinion as insufficient (57% now, compared to 72% in November 2018), in the last three years there has been a significant increase in the number of people satisfied with our country’s impact on EU affairs (a rise from 17% to 28%).

The aforementioned judgment of the Constitutional Tribunal increased the frequency of accusations that the policy of the Polish authorities lead to Polexit. Although the vast majority of respondents (66% now, compared to 72% in 2018) believe that Poland’s exit from the EU is not a realistic scenario at present, over the last three years there has been an increase in the number of people who think that Polexit is currently probable (a rise from 15% to 21%).

In your opinion, is the exit of Poland from the European Union currently a …

More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in Polish: “Poland in European Union”, November 2021. Fieldwork for national sample: October 2021, N=1157. The random sample is representative for adult population of Poland.

Party preferences

In recent years, a high level of electoral mobilization in Poland has been maintained. Since August 2018, the percentage of people confirming their participation in the parliamentary elections has not dropped below 70%. In November 2021, more than three-quarters (76%) declared their intention to vote in the elections.

In the second half of October, we saw a clear decline in support for the ruling coalition. The willingness to vote for Law and Justice (PiS), together with their coalition partners, was expressed by 28% of potential voters, 7 percentage points less than at the beginning of October. The November survey confirmed a decline in support for the governing party with a slight correction - Law and Justice is selected by 29% of declared voters. This means that public support for the ruling party and its coalition partners is the lowest in the entire period of its government since 2015. The last time PiS had fewer declared voters was in March 2015 (27% of citizens interested in participating in the elections).

Despite the significant drop in support, Law and Justice remains the leader of the party ranking. The Civic Coalition (KO) is in second place, with 18% of declared vote, according to data from November. The third place is occupied by Szymon Holownia’s Poland 2050, supported in November by 12% of potential voters. If the elections were held now, the right-wing Confederation, which has 6% support among the declared voters, and the Left, whose support is on the verge of the election threshold (5%), would still have a chance to enter the new parliament. In recent months, there has been an exceptionally large group of people who would like to take part in the elections, but refrain from unequivocally supporting any party or do not know which to choose.

Which party / grouping candidate would you vote for in the Sejm elections?

More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in Polish: “Poland in European Union”, November 2021. Fieldwork for national sample: October 2021, N=1157. The random sample is representative for adult population of Poland.
Coping with inflation

Inflation in Poland is at the highest level in 20 years. According to the Central Statistical Office data, the prices of consumer goods and services, compared to the same month last year, increased by 6.8% in October and by 7.7% in November.

Almost all respondents (98%) believe that prices have increased over the last year, and the vast majority speak of a significant increase in the prices of goods and services (84%).

Virtually all respondents feel the price increase to a greater or lesser extent. Only 3% of the people who noticed the price increase did not feel it at all. Price increases are felt more strongly in less well-off households. Respondents who were dissatisfied with the material conditions of their households most often declared that they felt the effects of price increases to a very large extent (51%), people in average living conditions most often declared that they felt price increases to a large extent (54%), and Poles satisfied with their financial condition usually felt them only to a small extent (46%).

To what extent are price increases felt in your household?

For almost all respondents, the most noticeable is the increase in food prices (92%), followed by the increase in fuel prices for means of transport (67%) and electricity (60%). In this context, more than one-third mentioned utilities, e.g. waste disposal, gas, water, sewage disposal (37%). For a large group of respondents, the price of building materials, home furnishings, renovation and construction services (29%), medicines (28%) and medical services (16%) is increasing. Other products and services were mentioned much less frequently.

Please indicate, which price increases are the most noticeable in your household?

Responses of people whose households felt price increase.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Product Category</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food</td>
<td>92%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petrol, diesel, gas and other fuels for means of transport</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electricity</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utilities, e.g. garbage collection, gas, water, sewage</td>
<td>37%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building materials, home or apartment furnishings, renovation and construction services</td>
<td>29%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medicines</td>
<td>28%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical services, including: medical and dental visits, tests, etc.</td>
<td>16%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cosmetics and cleaning products</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing, footwear</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport services</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electronic equipment</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telecommunication services, fees for TV, Internet, telephone</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other products and services</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Poles have various strategies to cope with inflation. The vast majority (75%) reduce expenses on everyday shopping, trying to buy less or looking for cheaper products. In the face of rising prices, Poles often give up larger expenses or postpone them (64%), reduce water, electricity and gas consumption (63%) as well as spending on entertainment, leisure and culture (57%). Some, on the other hand, use a different strategy than limiting expenses: they buy in advance for fear of a further increase in prices (18%).

Rising prices translate directly into the financial condition of respondents. Due to inflation, a significant part of respondents spend their savings on current expenses (43%), while people who lack savings get into debt (7%). Those who have savings are looking for ways to invest them so that they do not lose their value (9% of the total).

In a situation of rising fuel prices, a large proportion of people limit driving (28% experiencing an increase in prices, 37% owning cars). Inflation also affects the labour market, prompting employees to devote more time to work or change employment to get a better paid job (9% experiencing an increase in prices, 16% of the employed) and translates into an increase in wage expectations and, in general, an increase in wages (10% experiencing an increase in prices, 19% of the employed).

Religiousness of Poles

CBOS data from the last thirty years show a slow decline in religious faith. The percentage of the faithful, although falling, remains at a very high level: in March 1992,
believers and deep believers constituted a total of 94% of all respondents, and in August 2021 there were 87%. The percentage of non-believers (moderately and strongly expressing lack of faith) is slowly growing, and in 2021 amounted to a total of 12.5%.

The process outlined in the declarations of faith is more clearly marked in the declarations of religious practice. The percentage of regular churchgoers (attending at least once a week) dropped from 69.5% in March 1992 to 43% in August 2021. The percentage of non-practitioners rose: a decade ago, in 2011, it oscillated around 10%, while in the 2021 year it was 24%. From May 2020, we note an acceleration in the process of abandoning religious practices: almost every month the percentage of declarations of non-practice exceeds 20%, sometimes significantly. The pandemic certainly had an impact on the reduction of religious practices in this period.

Declared participation in religious services in the period 1992–2021. Do you take part in religious practices, such as: Holy Mass, other services or religious meetings?

Women practice more regularly than men. In their case, the category of regular practitioners is still the most numerous (January to August 2021: 44.5% on average), for men the largest group is those who practice irregularly (38% on average in 2021). Education influences the level of religious practice; in fact, the higher the level of education, the lower the level of regular religious practice, and the higher the proportion of non-practicing. Among people with higher education, the percentage of non-practitioners in 2021 reached 29%. The size of the place of residence is also important for religious practice. The lowest level of it is in large cities with at least 500,000 population, where the percentage of non-practicing in 2021 averaged 41%.

Taking into account age, the process of abandoning faith and religion is the fastest among the youngest. The proportion of regular practitioners in the youngest age group (18–24) fell from 69% in 1992 to 23% in 2021. The percentage of non-practicing increased from 8% to 36% during this period. The level of religious practice among respondents aged 25–34 was initially slightly lower than among the youngest: in 1992, 62% of them regularly practiced, while 8% never did. Currently, 26% of respondents of this age practice regularly, and 30% do not participate in religious services. The slightly higher level of religious practice than among the youngest proves that the process of abandoning the practice is somewhat slower in this age group. Although the changes in religiosity mainly affect younger respondents, they are also visible among middle-aged and older people. Among the oldest, aged 65 or over, the proportion of regular practitioners has fallen from 73% in 1992 to 56% today, and the proportion of non-participants has increased from 9% to 17.5%.

Declared participation in religious services in the period 1992–2021 by age.

More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in Polish: "Religiousness of Young People in Comparison to All Adults", November 2021. Fieldwork for national samples: March 1992 to August 2021. The random samples are representative for adult population of Poland. In each sample the number of respondents was ca. 1000.