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## IN ADDITION


TO THE REPORTS REFERRED TO ABOVE, THE FOLLOWING HAVE BEEN PUBLISHED RECENTLY (IN POLISH):

- Poles in the Face of the War in Ukraine
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- Social Moods in the First Half of The Year
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## Opinions on EU integration and policies


Acceptance of membership in the EU is almost universal in Poland. In June, support for our country's membership of this organization was declared by a record high percentage of 92% of respondents. Only 5% expressed their objection.

Attitude towards Poland's membership in the EU



While EU membership itself is not questioned, much more controversy is caused by the future direction of the EU. Most respondents (38%) would like to deepen integration between all EU countries. However, a large proportion (29%) are in favour of maintaining the current state of integration, and a noticeable group (16%) are also supporters of its limitation and increasing the role of nation states.

### Which of the following possible visions of the future of Poland and the European Union is closest to your own expectations?




- Poland's exit from the EU
- Limiting integration and increasing the role of nation states in the EU
- Maintaining the current state of integration
- Deepening integration between all EU member states
- The emergence of a "multi-speed" Europe in which some countries work together
- Don't know

Only very few would like Poland to leave the EU (3%) or to create a "multi-speed" Europe (4%). Comparing this year's results with data from several years ago (from 2017 and 2018), there are no significant changes in thinking about the future of the European Union. The lower percentage of supporters of the status quo than in previous studies means that we can cautiously note a slight polarization of expectations about the future of the EU.

The possibility of shaping a common policy in the EU is associated with the transfer to EU bodies of some of the competences of nation states. Thus, closer integration means limiting the sovereignty of the member states, or its pooling, in many areas. The issue of sovereignty of Poland has often been raised in recent years, especially in the context of changes in the judiciary and criticism voiced by EU bodies regarding the observance of the rule of law. Despite the disputes surrounding these issues, the assessment of Poland's sovereignty does not change much over time. In the opinion of over half of respondents (55%, 3 points more than in October 2021), EU membership does not restrict Poland's independence too much. One-third (33%) agree with

### Which opinion is closer to your own view?




- Membership in the EU does not excessively limit the sovereignty and independence of Poland
- Membership in the EU limits the sovereignty and independence of Poland too much
- Don't know

the opinion that presence in the Community limits the independence of our country too much.

After many months of delay, the European Commission and then the Council of the European Union approved the National Reconstruction Plan prepared by Poland. The disbursement of subsidies and loans for our country from this fund will be possible after the implementation of the reforms (the so-called milestones), including in the most contentious area of the judiciary, i.e. the disciplinary system for judges. These expectations are met by the provisions of the amended act on changes in the Supreme Court, incl. liquidation of the Disciplinary Chamber and establishment of the Professional Responsibility Chamber in its place. The enacted changes may, however, turn out to be insufficient to initiate payments.


Most respondents (70%) support Poland's withdrawal from some changes in the judiciary so that it would be possible to start payments for Poland from the EU Reconstruction Fund, while 12% are against concessions.

#### Do you support Poland's withdrawal from some changes in the judiciary so that it would be possible to start payments for Poland from the EU Reconstruction Fund?



Despite widespread support for EU membership and considerable approval for the further development of European integration, the assessment of the EU response to new challenges is not unequivocally positive. Taking into account the five important issues of recent years, the policy towards the COVID-19 pandemic and its consequences (55% positive, 33% negative), the reaction to the war in Ukraine (52% to 37%) and the observance of the rule of law in the European Union countries (52% to 30%) are assessed positively. The EU climate policy (42% positive and 39% negative) and migration policy (40% to 39%) are more controversial.

#### How do you assess the EU policy on the following issues:



More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in Polish: "Opinions about Integration and European Union's Activities", July 2022. Fieldwork for national sample: June 2022, N=1050. The random sample is representative for adult population of Poland.


## Trust in foreign politicians

The war in Ukraine focused Poles' attention on events outside our country. The actions taken in connection with the Russian aggression against Ukraine are probably one of the most important, though obviously not the only, criterion for assessing the leaders of states and other internationally active politicians.

The public attitude to the foreign politicians included in the survey is very diverse. The differences in assessments exceed those obtained in polls concerning attitudes towards Polish politicians.

Poles almost universally declare their trust in the President of Ukraine, Volodymyr Zelensky (86% of all respondents). The second place in the ranking of foreign politicians is occupied by the President of the United States, Joe Biden, who is trusted by nearly three-quarters of adults (74%). The Prime Minister of Great Britain, Boris Johnson, has the confidence of over half of respondents (55%). The UK politician, who remains as prime minister until the election of a new leader of the Conservative Party, announced his resignation on July 7, i.e. on the last day of the fieldwork, so this event did not have a significant impact on the results. Trust was expressed much more often than distrust towards the head of the European Commission Ursula von der Leyen (46% trust vs. 20% distrust). Other politicians included in the survey are more likely to arouse negative than positive reactions. Vladimir Putin (94% of declarations of distrust) and Aleksandr Lukashenko (87%) are definitely the worst evaluated. Viktor Orbán is clearly perceived negatively, as half declare distrust of him. Nearly two-fifths of respondents do not trust the leaders of France and Germany, Emmanuel Macron and Olaf Scholz (39% and 38% of declarations of distrust, respectively). Despite a similar percentage of negative opinions, the president of France attracts trust more often (27%) than the chancellor of Germany (17%).

#### Attitude towards foreign politicians




The least known of the politicians included in the survey, and at the same time perceived as untrustworthy, are Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Chinese leader Xi Jinping. The percentage of people who do not recognize these politicians is 45% and 43% respectively, while among respondents who recognize them, the declared distrust outweighs trust (29% distrust vs. 6% trust in case of the Chinese leader, 22% distrust vs. 13% trust in case of the President of Turkey).

More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in Polish: "Trust in Foreign Politicians", August 2022. Fieldwork for national sample: July 2022, N=1084. The random sample is representative for adult population of Poland.

## Opinions about Ukrainian refugees


The vast majority of respondents (84%) support accepting Ukrainian refugees in Poland. This result signifies a slight breakthrough of the downward trend we have observed since April. Immediately after the start of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the percentage of supporters of accepting refugees from this country reached a record 94%, then it fell by a few percentage points every month, but now it has increased by two points, from 82% in June to 84% in July. Only one in nine respondents (11%) expresses opposition to accepting Ukrainian refugees.

### Do you agree that Poland should accept Ukrainian refugees from the areas affected by the conflict?




Slightly more than half of Poles (53%) declare helping Ukrainian refugees themselves or claim that someone from their household does it. This percentage has stabilized since May and remains at around 50% for the third month in a row.

### Do you or someone in your household offer help to refugees from Ukraine voluntarily and free of charge?




The vast majority of Poles believe that refugees should obtain support from the Polish state during the first months of the war (87%) and in finding a job in Poland (85%). When it comes to assistance in settling in Poland permanently, opinions are divided, although the dominant belief is that the state should not grant it (47% against, 36% for). The majority of Poles (56%) also believe that the state should not support Ukrainian refugees throughout the entire duration of the war; 31% of respondents support such a proposition. Of course, no one knows how long the war will last and when its "first months" will end, during which refugees, according to the vast majority of respondents, should be supported by the state. However, taking into account the clear support for helping refugees look for a job, we can assume that the majority of Poles expect refugees to become independent as soon as possible.

### Should the Polish state should help Ukrainian refugees to:




Relatively few respondents have personally had difficulties related to the influx of refugees in access to the health care system (7%), finding or keeping a job (5%), access to apartments for rent or sale (4%) or in the functioning of schools and kindergartens. (3%). Larger percentages of respondents claim that, although they have not encountered such problems personally, they have heard about them. These situations mainly concern the use of medical services (18%) and access to housing (17%). Most respondents neither experienced nor heard of problems related to the influx of refugees.

### Have you personally experienced or heard about difficulties related to the influx of refugees from Ukraine in:



Poles' opinions on the long-term economic consequences of the influx of Ukrainian refugees are divided. The prevailing opinion is that the admission of refugees from Ukraine by Poland will not be economically beneficial for Poland in the long run (46%), while slightly fewer people (38%) are of the opposite opinion.

**Do you agree that accepting refugees from Ukraine in Poland will be economically beneficial for our country in the long run?**




More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in Polish: "Poles about War in Ukraine and Ukrainian Refugees", July 2022. Fieldwork for national sample: July 2022, N=1084. The random sample is representative for adult population of Poland.

## Reproductive goals and the degree of their satisfaction

All respondents, regardless of their age and how many children they have, were asked what number of children they consider ideal from their own point of view. Almost half of Poles would like to have two children (46%), and the second most frequent answer is three children, indicated by over one-fifth of adult Polish residents (22%). Every fourteenth person does not want to have any children (7%), less than one in ten would most like to have one child (9%), and 6% of people consider the optimal number to be four children. Other answers were indicated less frequently.


**Regardless of your marital status, age, and whether you have children or not, how many children you would like to have in your own life?**



The desired number of children varies according to the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents. In particular, in the 18-24 age group the share of people who do not want to have any children is 21%. Taking into account the fact that the vast majority of the youngest respondents do not have children yet, this means that one-fifth of young people do not plan to have children in their lives. Other groups that reject having children more often than on average are: people who do not practice religion at all (17%), identify themselves with the left politically (16%) and are relatively well-off, i.e. with a monthly per capita income of 4,000 PLN or more (14%). It is worth adding that the reluctance to have children does not depend on gender - it is the same for men and women (7% each).

For all respondents, an analysis was carried out comparing the preferred number of children with the actual number of offspring. It turned out that the level of satisfaction of the reproductive needs of Poles is only 54%. Most of the others have not realized their plans for the number of children. Every fifth person (20%) would like to have another child, 15% want two more children than they have, and four out of a hundred people would like to have three more children, while 2% want four or more children than they have. Overall, only 5% of respondents declare that they have more children than they would prefer.

**Level of satisfaction of reproductive needs:**



More information about this topic can be found in CBOS report in Polish: "Evaluation of Government's Family Policy and Fulfilment of Procreative Needs of Poles", July 2022. Fieldwork for national sample: July 2022, N=1084. The random sample is representative for adult population of Poland.

**For more information on CBOS services and publications please contact:**

**CBOS**

5/7, Świętojerska, 00-236 Warsaw, Poland

Phones: **(48) 22 629 35 69, 22 628 37 04** Fax: **(48) 22 629 40 89**

e-mail: [sekretariat@cbos.pl](mailto:sekretariat@cbos.pl) [www.cbos.pl](http://www.cbos.pl)

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